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Kaplan: Constitutional Law: Financing Public Education Under the Equal Pr

COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FINANCING PUBLIC EDUCATION
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE*
Hargravev. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970)
Plaintiffs' brought a class action seeking to enjoin2 the defendantss from
enforcing Florida's Millage Rollback Act.4 This statute, providing that any

county imposing more than ten mills in ad valorem property taxes is ineligible
to receive state Minimum Foundation Program (MFP)5 funds to aid in financing its public education system,8 was alleged to violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, 7 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida HELD, the millage limitation provision of the
'EDITOR's NoTm: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the fall 1970 quarter.
1. Plaintiffs were citizens and residents from sixteen Florida counties. Each was either
a freeholder-parent or a student in a Florida public school. 313 F. Supp. 944, 945 n.1 (M.D.
Fla. 1970).
2. The original complaint sought to require local tax collectors to collect more than
$62 million in back taxes. 313 F. Supp. 944, 949 (M.D. Fla. 1970). This sum reflected taxes
levied in excess of the 10-mill limit, which were not collected because each county reduced
its millage rather than lose state funds. The amended complaint sought only to enjoin
the enforcement of the statute and to have it declared unconstitutional. Brief for Plaintiff
at 4-5, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
3. Defendants included the State Board of Education and other officers who regulate
the amount of Minimum Foundation Program funds allocated to the county boards of
education. 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
4. Fla. Stat. §236.251 (1) (1969). This statute has been amended, but the 10-mill limitation has not been changed. FLA. STAT. §236.25 (Supp. 1970).
5. See FLA. STAT. ch. 236 (1969). The MFP was enacted in 1968 by an extraordinary
session of the Florida Legislature. The purpose of the legislation was to increase state aid
to education and provide "substantially equal public educational opportunities." FLA. STAT.
§236.01 (1969). The program now accounts for the most significant part of the state's
financing of education. BUREAU OF RESEARCH, DFP'T OF EDuC., R.ESEARCH REPORT 83, FLORIDA
PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAM 4 (1970).
6. As of 1965, at least 34 states had tax limitation laws similar to Florida's.
M. REMMLEIN, TAx LIMITATION LAws 9 (1965).
7. The district court had originally held 28 U.S.C. §1341 (1964) to be a jurisdictional
bar to the action. This statute provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." The Court of Appeals, holding
that the complaint alleged a basis for equitable relief and presented a substantial constitutional qustion, reversed and remanded with directions to convene a three-judge district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1964). Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.
1969). Section 2281 provides: "[A] permanent injunction restraining the enforcement . . .
of any State statute . . . shall not be granted . . . upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a
district court of three judges . . . "

[590]
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Millage Rollback Act (MRA) unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection
of the law. 8
Despite the "judicial equality explosion" of recent years,9 political and
public concern for inequality in educational opportunity within a state has
lagged.1 0 Recently, however, courts11 and commentators 2 have begun to
deal with the relationship between the equal protection dause and school
finance plans. The instant case represents the first successful attack against
ad valorem millage restrictions and represents a step toward education finance
reform.
The concept of equal protection has traditionally been viewed as requiring
uniform treatment of persons similarly situated. 13 Although all of Florida's
school children are-similarly situated as students, the wording of the MRA
makes it dear they are not to receive uniform treatment in that students residing in counties levying in excess of ten mills are deprived of state MFP
funds. Equal protection is not violated, however, merely because some persons
are treated differently than others. 4 Legislatures are allowed wide discretion
in making statutory classifications resulting in different treatment"5 and these
classifications are valid when they bear a reasonable relationship to a proper
legislative purpose.- Applying this test to the statute in the instant case, both
the classifications created and the statute's legislative purpose must be examined.
The statute created two classes: (1) counties taxing at a rate greater than
ten mills and (2) counties taxing at a rate at or below ten mills. The court did
8. 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970). In so holding, the court relied on Zwicker v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), and Harman v. Forssenuis, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), to dismiss
defendant's contention that the abstention doctrine was applicable. Similarly, the court

ruled that 28 U.S.C. §1341 (1964) (see note 7 supra) did not bar the action because: "Mhe
plaintiffs in the instant case are not attempting to strike down an assessment and collection
scheme but, on the contrary, are attempting to obtain the right to have such a scheme."
313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
9. See Michelman, Foreword to On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HLv.L. Rxv. 7 (1969).
10. See A. WISE, RicH SCHOOLS PooR SCHOOLS 195-98 (1968).
11. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.1968), aff'd per curiam sub. nor
Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra. See also
Silva v. Atascardero Unified School Dist., No. 595954 (Super. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., filed
Sept. 26, 1968); Board of Educ. v. State, Gen. Civ. Action No. 103342 (Cir. CL, Wayne
County, Mich., filed Feb. 2, 1968); Guerra v. Smith, Civ. No. A-69-CA-9 (W.D. Tex., filed
Jan. 28, 1969); Bellow v. State, No. 127060 (Cir. Ct., Dane County, Wis., fied Jan. 24, 1969).
12. E.g., J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PuBuc EDUCATION
(1970); A. WIsE, RICH SCHOOLS PooR SCHOOLS (1968); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational
Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CA.m
L. REv. 305 (1969); Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case
for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 7 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968).
15. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104 (1898).
16. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that Sunday closing laws
bore a reasonable relationship to the proper legislative purpose of enhancing the health

and recreational atmosphere of the populace).
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not discuss the case in terms of these classifications, however, since counties
previously taxing above ten mills chose to conform to the statute in order to
avoid losing state funds. Thus, the actual effect of the statute was to create
a single class of counties, all taxing at or below ten mills. The court, therefore,
analyzed the effect of the millage reductions resulting from the MRA.'17
A statute that appears to apply uniformly may nevertheless violate the
equal protection clause if its effect18 or application-9 is discriminatory. Consequently, the fact that the MRA applied uniformly to all counties was of
little significance since the effect of the statute was to discriminate among
counties according to their respective wealth. 20 Because the statute forced each
county to tax at no more than ten mills, the tax revenue per pupil was in direct
proportion to the number of students and assessed value of property in the
county. In two counties having the same number of students, the county
with the larger tax base would generate more tax revenue per pupil than the
21
county with the smaller tax base.
While the court correctly analyzed the discriminatory effect of the statute,
it failed to identify dearly the victims or the exact grounds of the discrimination. Although the opinion implies that the poorer counties are the victims
of the discrimination, 22 the equal protection clause has been held not to require equality between counties. 2 3 Realistically, the students residing in the
poorer counties are the victims of the discrimination caused by unequal
educational expenditures. Furthermore, despite the court's implicit reference
to wealth as the discriminatory factor, it appears that geographical location
is more precisely the cause of discrimination. If a student traveled throughout
the state the revenue expended on his education would vary with his residence,
not his personal income. In any event, the discriminatory effect of the MRA
was apparent to the court. The restrictions imposed by the statute were totally
unrelated to the educational needs of a particular county and the statute's
effect was to grant MFP benefits only to counties complying with a condition
24
that compelled discrimination among students.
Having determined that the effect of the MRA was discriminatory, the
court sought to determine whether there was a proper legislative purpose
to sustain the statute. Two tests have been promulgated by the Supreme Court
for determining whether a statutory classification is reasonable in light of its
17. The immediate effect of the MRA was to reduce the total revenue of those counties
that had been taxing in excess of 10 mills, by $54,074,911. 313 F. Supp. 944, 950 (M.D.

Fla. 1970).
18. E.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding a
$1.50 poll tax unconstitutional because, although it was assessed equally, its effect was to
discriminate between the rich and poor).
19. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
20. 313 F. Supp. 944, 948 (MJ). Fla. 1970).
21. The court indicated that if Charlotte and Bradford counties each taxed at the 10mill limit, Charlotte would raise $725 per student while Bradford would raise only $52
per student. Id. at 947.
22. Id. at 947, 948.

23. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1954).
24. 313 F. Supp. 944,947, 948 (M.D. FIa. 1970).
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legislative purpose. Under the first of these, the "rational basis" test, the
inquiry is whether the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state end.2 5 Although a rational legislative purpose will sustain most
statutes, a second test, the "compelling governmental interest" test,26 is implemented when a classification infringes upon a constitutional 27 or fundamental right,28 or when lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race. 29 The
court, unable to find a valid legislative purposes to justify the discriminatory
classifications created by the statute, held the statute unconstitutional pursuant
31
to the "rational basis" test.
Although the court's holding is very narrow, the broad implication of the
decision is that a state school system cannot be financed by a plan based
largely on local ad valorem taxation. Florida's public schools are presently
financed by such a plan. Financial support for Florida's public schools is
derived principally from two sources:3 2 local ad valorem property taxes and
state aid to counties through the Minimum Foundation Program.33 Local
taxes are divided into county millage, which is levied by local school boards,
not in excess of ten mills 3 4 and district millage, which must be authorized by
vote of the county residents and is effective for a period not to exceed two
years 5
The second source of educational funds, the Minimum Foundation Program, utilizes a complex formula to determine the cost of financing a minimal

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 634 (1969).
Id.
McDonald v. Board of Election Conm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
Id.
The original purpose of the constitutional millage limitation on county school

boards was to give tax relief to Florida freeholders. Political expediency was also a significant factor in these provisions. State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d 130,
132 (Fla. 1969). See also J. BUREHEAD, STATE AND LocAL TAxEs FOR PuBLIc EDUCATION 18

(1963).
31. By basing the decision on the rational basis test the court was not called upon to
discuss the stricter compelling governmental interest test. 313 F. Supp. 944, 948 (M.D.

Fla. 1970).
32. In addition to state and local financial support for education, the federal government provides minimal amounts to Florida for educational purposes. In 1968-1969 the
federal government provided $39,957,953.76 directly to local governments and channeled
$50,155,636.26 to local governments through the state. This represents 8.78% of the total

education revenue in Florida. Table of County Revenue Receipts published by Florida
Department of Education (1970).
33. It is estimated that in 1970-1971 this program will provide $569,096,786 to local
governments, representing 72.1% of the total state aid to education. There are 13 other
types of state education grants to local governments that are estimated to total $219,571,131
for the 1970-1971 school year. BuREAu OF REsEARCH, DEP'T oF Enuc., REsEARCH REPoRT 83,
FLORIDA PuBLc SCHooL FANcE PROGRw 4 (1970).
34. FLA. CoNST. art. VII, §9(b).
35. Id. Although the constitution specifically states the vote shall be of freeholders only,
this requirement is probably no longer valid in light of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 US.

204 (1970).
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county educational system.86 After the MFP cost is calculated, the amount the
county must raise through taxing to be eligible for MFP funds is deducted3 7
The county ultimately receives from the state the difference between the predetermined cost of its particular minimum foundation program and the
amount required to be provided by the county.$"
An examination of Florida's method of financing public education reveals
discrimination without the application of the MRA. s9 For example, if Glades
County taxes at a rate of ten mills it will generate approximately 800 dollars
in tax revenue per pupil. 40 In order for Gadsden County to provide the same
amount of revenue per student it would have to tax at a rate of more than
100 mills. 41 Although Gadsden County could legally levy such a millage, the
2
likelihood of this action is doubtful.4
The fact that a county may legally provide the same amount of money
per pupil as other counties does not insure com5liance with the equal protection clause. Should the residents of Gadsden County not authorize the
requisite millage, the per pupil expenditures in Gadsden County will be less
than in Glades County. This will result in virtually the same kind of discrimination that existed under the MRA. A student's education will continue
to depend on the tax base of the county in which he resides. Moreover, it is
the state, not the county, that is responsible for the school system 4s and therefore subject to an equal protection attack. Once the state undertakes the
obligation of providing public education- it must make education available
36. FLA. STAT. §§236.01-.07, .08-.13, .251 (Supp. 1970). The cost of the MFP for each
county is the total of the computed costs for instructional salaries, transportation, education

improvement expense, and various other current expenses. FLA. STAT. §236.07 (l)-(8) (Supp.
1970).
37. FLA- STAT. §236.07(10) (Supp. 1970). For 1970-1971 the amount of revenue a county
must raise in order to be eligible for MFP funds is equal to 95% of the calculated yield

of a 4-mill levy on 100% of the nonexempt assessed valuation of the district. (There are
additional provisions for counties operating kindergartens.) FLA. STAT. §236.07 (9)(a) (Supp.
1970).
38. FLA. STAT. §236.07(10) (Supp. 1970). Every county in Florida qualifies to participate
in the MFP. The range runs from De Soto County, which had a 1969-1970 required local
effort of $156,239 but actually collected taxes exceeding this amount by 267.83%, to
Liberty County with a required local effort of $38,397 and taxes exceeding this amount by
28.57%. BuREAU or REsEAECH, DEPT or Euc., REsERca REPORT 80, RANKING or THE
CouNTIs 31 (1970).
39. It should be noted that the constitutionality of the MRA has not been decided by
a Florida court. It is possible that a state court would uphold its constitutionality. Cf.
Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141 (Ist D.C.A. Fa. 1970).
40.

BuREAu

Or REsEARCH, DEPT OF EDUC.,

RESEARCH REPORT 80, RANKING

OF THE

Couirrrs 9, 21 (1970) (this figure was computed from tables 1.10 and 3.1).
41. Id.
42. According to Dr. R. L. Johns, Co-director of the National Educational Finance
Project, there is a definite trend among freeholders to vote against additional millage levies
and "the situation will get worse before it improves." Cormier, Fed Up With Taxes? The
Experts Know You Are!, Gainesville Sun (Fla.), Oct. 4, 1970, §A at I, col. 1.
43.

A. WISE, RicH SCHOOLS PooR ScHooLs

93-98 (1970).

44. FrA. CoNsT. art. IX, §1 provides in part: "Adequate provision shall be made by
law for a uniform system of free public schools... "
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to all on equal terms.4 While the state has attempted to equalize per pupil
expenditures through the MFP program, 4 variations will continue to exist
as long as counties must depend on local tax revenue to help finance their
school systems. 47 Consquently, the state has given tacit consent to statewide
variations in per student expenditures.
Despite the narrow holding and the continued existence of intercounty
variations, the decision represents a victory for Florida's school children.4 8
Counties may now levy in excess of ten mills in order to improve their school
systems. However, because the plaintiffs did not contest the variations in per
pupil expenditures resulting from county-to-county tax base variances4 9 the
court did not specifically reach the more important issue of whether the
equal protection clause requires equal per pupil expenditures throughout
the state. The language of the court and the reasoning behind the decision
has, however, led some commentators to conclude that the decision represents
a trend in that direction. 50
If the instant case is to become the vehicle for a broader attack on school
finance plans, one obstacle to be obviated is the recent decision of Mclnnis v.
Shapiro.51 Mclnnis, unlike the instant case, reached the heart of the constitutional issue and held that the fourteenth amendment does not necessarily require equal per pupil expenditures throughout a state. The court found the
Illinois scheme for financing public education neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and held the controversy nonjusticiable because there were no

45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
46. Despite the existence of the MFP and other state aid to county education systems,
there are great variations in per pupil operating expenses throughout the state. The range
is from $582.93 per pupil in Seminole County to $1,036A8 per pupil in Glades County.
Brief for Appellant at 11-13, Kirk v. Hargrave, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969).
47. County variations in per pupil expenditures are by no means peculiar to Florida.
In Virginia the range is from $541 to $71; in Illinois from $1,084 to $350; in California
from $1,353 to $265; in New York from $1,600 to $470. Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause,
1970 Wis. L. Ray. 7, 10 (1970).
48. One authority, however, has suggested that variations in per pupil expenditures
will actually increase because counties now have no millage limitations. Interview with
Dr. Kern Alexander, Co-director of the National Educational Finance Project, in Gainesville,
Fla., Oct. 30, 1970. While this argument has some merit two points should be noted: (1) it
is probable that only a few counties will in fact exceed 10-mills (see note 42 supra); (2)
generally it will be the poorer counties that exceed 10 mills. Those counties levying in
excess of 10 mills for 1967-1968 had an average rank of 39 among all 67 counties in assessed
valuation per pupil. In addition, among the 15 richest counties in the state, in terms of
assessed valuation per pupil, only 2 counties levied in excess of 10 mills for 1968-1969.
Computed from table 3.7 in BURFAU OF REsEARCH, Dm"T oF EDuc., REsEARCH REPORT 80,
RANKING oF THE CouNTIs 23 (1970). See Silard S. White, supra note 47, at 9.
49. Brief for Plaintiff at 39-40, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
50. See Harvard Center for Law and Education, Inequality in Education 17 (1970);
Shanks, Equal Educationand the Law, 39.AM. SCHoLAR 255 (1970).
51. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. III. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom., Mclnnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969). Mr. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that probable jurisdiction
should be noted.
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"manageable standards by which a court [could] determine when the con'52
stitution [was] satisfied and when it [was] violated.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed Mclnnis, several convincing arguments have been advanced to support the proposition that this summary
affirmance, without full briefs or arguments, was purely technical and will
not preclude the Court from hearing a similar case in the future.53 Two
arguments may be made to support the proposition that the equal protection
clause requires equal per pupil expenditures throughout a state. First,
because the Court has held a student's race shall not determine the quality

of his education, 5 likewise, a student's geographical location should not
determine the quality of his education. Second, because the Court has held
a person's residence shall not affect the weight of his vote,5 5 a person's
residence should not affect the quality of his education.
While the arguments against existing school finance plans may appear
convincing, a number of critical questions remain unresolved. First, a workable definition of equal educational opportunity must be adopted. 50 While
equal per pupil expenditures are usually considered tantamount to equal
educational opportunity,57 many other factors, such as differences in the cost
of educational materials throughout a state and differences in educational
needs among students should be considered in any comprehensive definition. 58
In addition, it must be determined what type of financial plan would meet
the requirements of the equal protection clause. The various plans suggested
include redrawing district lines to equalize each district's tax base;5 9 abolishing
local property taxes in favor of a state property tax;60 financing education
solely with state funds through corporate or personal income taxes; 1 and

52. Mcnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335 (N.D. IIl. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub
nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
53. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State Finance Structures, 57 CALF. L. REv. 305, 308-09 (1969); Shanks, supra note
50, at 264.
54. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

55. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. See generally A. WISE, supra note 43, at 143-59.
57. In C. BENsoN, THE CHEERFUL PROSPECT 22-24 (1965), the author lists four charac-

teristics of counties with high per pupil expenditures: (1) the salaries paid to teachers are
school buildings are more attractive;
notably higher; (2) they have fewer oversized classes; (3)
(4) they provide more auxiliary services, particularly library facilities. These factors seem
to indicate a positive relationship between the amount of per pupil expenditures and
educational quality. But see A. WIsE, supra note 43, at 139-42.
58. One of defendant's primary contentions in the instant case was that a disparity
in dollars per child from county to county would not necessarily create a disparity in
educational opportunity. Brief for Defendant at 4-5, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944
(M.D. Fla. 1970).
59. Silard & White, supra note 47, at 28-29.
60. Id. at 29-30.
61. One expert in the field of school finance, Dr. R. L. Johnson, has suggested a 7%
corporate income tax for Florida, which would raise about $196 million annually; a 7%/
personal income tax, which would raise about $588 million annually; and various changes
in the sales tax, which would raise about $400 million annually. Cormier, supra note 42.
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"power equalizing."2 Once these issues are resolved, it must be determined
whether education is a fundamental right,
pelling governmental interest" test.6 '

s

and thus subject to the "com-

The impact of the instant case is likely to be felt on two levels. For the

counties of Florida the case represents an opportunity to increase millage
rates for the purpose of bettering their school systems. While discrepancies

in per pupil expenditures are certain to persist, counties are no longer barred
from attempting to eradicate these differences. On the national level, the case
represents the first departure from Mclnnis and presents an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to determine the relationship between the
equal protection clause and public school finance.63
ERic F. KAPLAN

62. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
201-42 (1970). The essence of power equalizing is that "[t]he quality of public education
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole." Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, supra note 53, at 311. "Irrespective of the amount of the local collections
the district would be permitted to spend that amount-and only that amount-per pupil
fixed by law for the tax rate chosen." Id. at 320.

63. Although the Supreme Court has never held that educational opportunity is a
fundamental right, there are indications it would so rule: "The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker, 564 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Brown v. Board of Educ., 547 U.S. 483, 493
(1954). "The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny." Illinois v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
231 (1948).
64. It should be noted that the compelling interest test may also be applicable if the
effect of current school finance plans is considered to discriminate on the basis of wealth.
65. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in the instant case. 39
U.S.L.W. 3199 (1970).
ErroR's NOTE: The judgment in the instant case has been vacated by the Supreme Court
on the ground that the district court should have declined jurisdiction based on the abstention doctrine. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). The state court action in this matter,
School Board of Broward County v. Christian (No. 69-932 Second Judicial Circuit) is still
pending.
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